-
Website
http://www.ohgizmo.com/ -
Original page
http://www.ohgizmo.com/2006/05/22/vectrotel-provides-secure-mobile-communications/ -
Subscribe
All Comments -
Community
-
Top Commenters
-
facebook-19701276
34 comments · 2 points
-
TrishaG
17 comments · 2 points
-
cirez
17 comments · 1 points
-
joeythenifty
22 comments · 1 points
-
Dennis Box
18 comments · 1 points
-
-
Popular Threads
-
Win an HP Envy 15 Notebook!
2 weeks ago · 279 comments
-
Fish Tank Friday: Blowfish
2 days ago · 11 comments
-
Private: 8 LED Desk Lamp Powered By A Telephone Jack
2 days ago · 13 comments
-
Private: SoundRacer – Make The Family Sedan Sound Like A Supercar
1 day ago · 6 comments
-
Private: Finally Some Real Innovation! Polymer Spit Balls Grow To 200x Their Original Size
5 days ago · 22 comments
-
Win an HP Envy 15 Notebook!
Diffie-Hellmann key exchange is vulnerable to "Man-in-the-Middle" attacks. Unless you performed the initial key exchange through some secure channel {say, InfraRed} then you can't be sure someone isn't pretending to you to be the person you called, and to the person you called to be you.
Also, without access to the source code, you can never, ever be sure that an encryption system is even half secure.
you read out the HASH checksum that is indicated on the display to teh person on the other end and if it matches then there is no man in the middle.
Best Regards,
Guylain Lavoie, M5T Inc.
Also... Tanner/Lane-Smith/Lareau have some things to say about encrypting voice over the data channel in their DefCon presentation from last year [PDF].
My personal experience is that latencies in excess of 350 msec are typical over EDGE, so... get ready to pretend you're GI-Joe by ending every sentence with "Over."
Just remember... The DoD is moving away from DH over a finite field in favor of EQMV and ECDH (more info at http://www.cryptonomicon.net/msh/2006/02/no-dl-or-rsa-in-suite-b.html.)
Finally... When using DH, both parties need to be using the same values for the generator and the modulus. There was some concern in the 90's about insecure values for g and p; if an attacker could force you to use an insecure generator, he might be able to recover the agree'd key by listening in to the key establishment conversation. I seem to recall that Vaudenay published a similar attack for DSA.
In any event, the moral of the story is. Yawn. Another phone that encrypts voice over a high-latency GSM data channel. I'm not the worlds biggest fan of X.509, but it would be awefully cool if you could exchange self signed certs via IR or SMS, then make a non-encrypted call, verify the cert fingerprints, assign "trust" to the local copy of the cert and use this trusted cert as part of the authentication phase before key agreement.
DTLS (SSL for lossy, UDP style connections) was recently published. This might be a good option for people wanting to do this in the future. That way you could just do SIP/RTP over GSM (or WiFi) with DTLS configured to do ephemeral keying.
Just a though.
we want to buy 200 pecs of vectrotel x8
The company vecprom says, that the S3 is saver then the new. Its logical, because their is no way to secure pictures or sms, it cost to much capacity. To secure not only voice, you can get vecprom dms. This is the network solution.
rosieponder@verizon.net
Not only do they try to rip you off, they send your email out and you get a ton of junk mail.
Who do I contact? The hyperlink you have listed in no good.